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Some Bad News is Good News for Foreign Investors: The Case of 
Intellectual Property Rights Infringement in China 
 
 
Executive Summary 
Despite China’s attractiveness to foreign investors, intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection in China has not caught up with international standards. This research aims to 
quantify the relationships between IPR violations, government effectiveness, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows in the context of China. Our econometric modeling and 
estimation based on provincial level data over 2002-2012 show that in an early development 
stage of law and regulatory enforcement, the bad news of a rising number of IPR dispute 
cases signals the good news of an improvement in law and regulatory enforcement, which 
encourages IPR owners to raise legal cases. By contrast, in the later development stage when 
law and regulatory enforcement has become much more effective, the bad news of a rising 
number of IPR disputes manifests itself as real bad news. Furthermore, this study confirms 
that FDI inflows enhance IPR protection through improving government effectiveness and 
the government effectiveness is one of the key factors promoting FDIs. 
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Dual Track System of IPR Enforcement, IPR 
infringement, Local Protectionism, Government Effectiveness, China   
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1. Introduction 
 
China has experienced rapid economic development and growth since the initiation of market 
reform in 1978 and has emerged as a key player in global trade and financial market. China 
became the world’s largest exporter of goods in 2009 and overtook the US as the world 
number one trading nation in 2013, with a trade volume over US$4 trillion (WTO, 2014). 
According to the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures (IMF, 2014), China also 
surpassed the US as the world’s largest economy in 2014 in terms of GDP based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2014, China’s PPP-adjusted GDP reached US$17.63 
trillion or 16.48 % of the world’s total, compared with the corresponding US figures of 
US$17.4 trillion or 16.28 % of the world’s total. Such rapid economic development has made 
China the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment since 2002. In 2014, China 
attracted US$ 128 billion of FDI (UNCTAD, 2015).  Despite China’s increased role in the 
global economy and attractiveness to foreign investors, it has been widely acknowledged that 
the level of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in China has not caught up with 
international standards. This disparity between China’s emerged economic power at the 
global level and its weak enforcement mechanisms for IPR laws at the national level has 
made IPR protection in China one of the top concerns in the global business community. 
According to the latest figures, 72%, 77%, and 87% of the total counterfeiting and infringing 
goods seized at  the US, EU, and Japan customs, respectively, came from China in 2012 (US 
IPR Seizure Statistics 2012, Commission, 2013; Japan Customs, 2013).   
 This great concern of the global business community in general and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) from the OECD countries in particular has stimulated an emerging body 
of literature dealing with the issue of weak IPR protection in China and the implications for 
MNEs in the disciplines of law (e.g., Kassner, 2012; Chow, 2010; Rezler, 2010; Sepetys and 
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Cox, 2009; Gabriel, 2008) and business management and economics (e.g., Zimmerman and 
Chaudhry, 2009; Chapa and LeMaster, 2007; Yu, 2007; Hung, 2003). Surprisingly, however, 
there has been a lack of formal econometric work in the literature to quantify the relationship 
between IPR violations, government effectiveness, and FDI inflows in the context of China-
specific institutional environment. In light of the growing significance of China in the global 
economy, it is of both academic and policy importance to investigate the interactive 
relationship between IPR infringement incidence and the government effectiveness and, 
further, the interactive relationships between FDI activities of MNEs and government 
effectiveness and IPR infringement disputes in the context of China.  
 This research aims to fill this important niche. Drawing on insights from broad 
theoretical literature, this paper develops three analytical models. The first one suggests a 
non-linear relationship between the observed relative level of infringement claim cases and 
the level of government effectiveness, where the observed count of infringement cases equals 
the total number of infringement incidences times the probability of filing a claim with the 
regulatory authorities. The second model is an extension of the first model by including FDI 
as an independent variable. It suggests that inward FDI indirectly contributes to a higher level 
of IPR protection mainly through enhancing government effectiveness, because local 
governments in China compete with each other to attract FDI and understand that local 
government effectiveness is attractive for FDI in general and FDI with advanced technology 
in particular. The third model suggests that the attractiveness of a host region for 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) is closely associated with the effectiveness of IPR law and 
regulatory enforcement and the government effectiveness of the regional authority. MNEs 
prefer to make their investments in host regions with a more transparent and effective 
institutional framework. A quadratic specification is adopted to test the relationships 
suggested by these three models.  
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The dataset for the testing include the number of patent infringement claim cases 
under administrative investigation in 30 provinces (including 4 provincial-level 
municipalities) of China during 2002-2012, the government effectiveness index in 30 Chinese 
provinces constructed by the World Bank in 2006, and the number of foreign funded 
enterprises in 30 Chinese provinces during 2002-2012. The Hausman-Taylor estimator is 
employed to run the econometric estimations because this estimator allows for the time-
invariant regressors (c.f. Government effectiveness) to be correlated with the unobserved 
individual effects. The estimation results are in line with our expectation. The first set of 
results confirms an inverted-U shaped curvilinear effect running from government 
effectiveness to the relative level of the number of infringement claim cases. The second set 
of results show that FDI inflows modify the relationship between government effectiveness 
and the relative level of the number of infringement claim cases in a way to contribute to the 
reduction of the latter mainly through FDI’s impact on the level of transparency and 
effectiveness of institutional framework.  The third set of results show that government 
effectiveness has a direct impact on FDI inflows, indicating that a host region with a better 
government effectiveness attract more FDI inflows; furthermore, the relative level of the 
count of infringement claim cases has a positive impact on FDI inflows. These three sets of 
results are robust for a number of popular control variables and the second set is also robust 
for alternative measures of FDI inflows.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional 
foundation of IPR regimes in China. In section 3, based on analytical discussions on IPR 
protection, government effectiveness and FDI, we develop three models to characterize the 
interactive relationships between the number of infringement claim cases, the index of 
government effectiveness, and FDI inflows. In Section 4, we define the key variables and 
suggest the best available estimation method – the Hausman-Taylor estimator. In Section 5, 
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we estimate the models using the Hausman-Taylor estimator and report the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 6 discusses the theoretical and policy implications of the findings and 
presents concluding remarks.  
 
2. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection in China 
 
2.1 China as a key source of counterfeit goods to the world market 
The recent surge in exports of counterfeits worldwide and in particular, those from China to 
other countries, has caused many world leading MNCs to declare intellectual property rights 
(IPR) infringements to be an urgent global business problem (Economist, 2010). It is virtually 
impossible to accurately estimate the value of infringing goods originating from China, but it 
is evident that infringing production in China has grown alongside the remarkable growth in 
the Chinese economy and export (Chow, 2010, Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009). In 2012, 
the US, EU and Japan reported a total of 139,928 seizures of shipments of counterfeit and 
infringing goods by their customs authorities, which represents more than a five-fold increase 
from the 24,621 cases in 2003.1 
 China is generally acknowledged as the world’s number one source of counterfeit and 
infringing goods in recent years. For example, the total value of infringing goods seized at the 
US ports of entry was $ 1.26 billion in 2012. Of this total, more than $ 900 million, or 72% of 
the total, originated from China (US IPR Seizure Statistics 2012). In the same year, infringing 
products from China accounted for 77 % and 87 % of the total amount seized by the customs 
authorities of the European Union and Japan respectively (European Commission, 2013; 
                                                          
1 Authors’ calculation, based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of International Trade, 2004, 2013; 
European Commission, 2013; Japan Customs, 2008, 2013. 
7 
 
Japan Customs,  2013).2  
 
2.2 A wide gap between formulation of IPR regimes and its enforcement 
In recent years, it has been observed that the statute laws on IPR in China have been 
increasingly converging with international standards (Kassner, 2012; Sepetys and Cox, 2009; 
Gabriel, 2008; Yu, 2007). China joined several international organizations and agreements, 
and promulgated domestic legislation, including the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1982 and the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China in 1984. In 2001, 
China joined the WTO and since then further amended its IPR laws and regulations to 
comply with the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) (Rezler, 2010; Chapa and LeMaster, 2007). In spite of continuous development of 
China’s intellectual property law following the international standards, the enforcement of 
these laws has not been consistent across provinces and cities in China and has not met 
international expectations (Kassner, 2012; Yu, 2007). A wide gap between the formulation of 
the statute IPR laws and their enforcement in China can be attributed to a combination of (i) 
regional disparity in economic development (Yu, 2007), and (ii) the federalism-Chinese style, 
which is characterized as a decentralized, multi-layered, multi-regional governance structure 
with relatively harder budget constraints for lower level local governments, and inter-
jurisdictional competition (Weingast, Qian, and Montinola, 1995; Cao, Qian, and Weingast, 
1999). Regional disparity in economic development implies diverse interests among 
                                                          
2 Based on the assumption that most of the counterfeit and infringing goods exported from Hong Kong were 
actually produced in China (Chow, 2010), the total value of seized counterfeit and infringing goods exported 
from China and Hong Kong to the U.S., EU and Japan totalled $ 1.1 billion, € 862.9 million, and ￥18.4 billion 
in 2012, which accounted for 84 %, 87 % and 94 % of all seizures respectively (Authors’ calculation, based on 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of International Trade, 2013 on slides 10-11; European  
Commission, 2013: p.7 and p.18; Japan Customs, 2013, IMPORT 9 in p.8 ). 
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provincial and municipal governments with respect to enforcement of IPR laws. For some 
local governments, intellectual property infringement is in fact beneficial to their local 
economies because it can create new jobs and tax revenues (at least) in the short term (Chow, 
2010; Tao, 2007). With local protectionism under the China-specific decentralized 
governance structure, some local governments with relative low levels of economic 
development prioritize the protection of local interest above the national interest of 
complying IPR laws with the international standards. Therefore, these local governments are 
less likely to impose strict enforcement measures against alleged infringement cases (Chow, 
2010; Gabriel, 2008; Tao, 2007; Cox and Sepetys, 2005; Wang, 2004).  
 
3. Theoretical Background and Model Development 
3.1 Influence of government effectiveness and inward FDI on patent infringement 
claims in China 
Following the logic of gradualist reform, China has adopted a dual track system of IPR 
enforcement (Kassner, 2012; Cox and Sepetys, 2005; Wang, 2004). The first track is the 
judicial enforcement process, which involves filing a complaint to a judicial civil court. The 
second track is the administrative enforcement process, which is regarded as one of the 
distinctive features of China’s IPR protection regime. On the administrative track, the 
administrative agencies investigate infringement cases and penalize the guilty party. Due to 
the legacies of China’s centrally planned economy system, the administrative proceedings 
have played arguably the most important role in IPR enforcement (Kassner, 2012). Therefore, 
the number of administrative infringement claim cases under investigation in a province can 
be regarded as an informative indicator of the extent to which the province commits to 
combat IPR infringements.  Table 1 reports the spatial distribution of patent infringement 
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claimed through the administrative track by three provincial groups for 2002-2012. From 
2002 to 2012, the number of patent disputes handled by local IP administrative authorities 
totalled 14,451 cases. In terms of geographical distribution, more than 70% of patent 
infringement was claimed in the coastal region in 2002. While the coastal region retained its 
dominant position in infringement claims, its share in the national total decreased by 21.64 
percentage points from 72.34% in 2002 to 50.70% in 2011. The central region took 18.72 
percentage points of the share from the coastal region. The west basically kept the same 
growth pace with that of the national total, swinging between 11.15% and 17.89%. The 
coefficient of variations (CV) across the three regions shows a decline trend and decreased by 
about 50% from 2002 to 2012, implying a tendency of reduced disparity.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 To quantify the influence of government effectiveness on IPR enforcement, the most 
relevant and available data in China is the number of patent infringement cases claimed, 
claim count. It can be decomposed into a product of the total infringement count (TIC) and 
the probability of filing a claim. This decomposition captures two distinct aspects of patent 
infringement cases. TIC can be considered as the “supply side” of the infringement claims as 
it defines the maximum possible number of infringement claims. The level of the supply side 
activity would be affected by the usual business environments such as the market size, the 
expected benefits of those business activities which are based on patent piracy, and the 
potential punishment if being caught by government enforcement agencies. It would be 
natural to expect TIC to be negatively correlated with the law and regulatory enforcement as 
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tighter enforcement will increase the probability of being caught, getting unfavorable ruling, 
and paying damage compensation. With respect to the probability of filing a claim, please 
note that not all patent infringement cases are brought to the attention of regulatory bodies. 
Some cases are simply not caught on the radar of patent holders. Even if patent holders know 
the existence of solid infringement cases, however, they may not want to bring such cases to 
the government or the court because the costs of legal action may exceed the expected 
benefits. Generally speaking, under a weaker enforcement system, a case is less likely to be 
accepted and then ruled favorably to the patent holders. This will lead to a lower probability 
of filing claims. In recognizing this, we hypothesize that the “demand side” of piracy claims 
is positively correlated with the law and regulatory enforcement.    
  Given that Claims Count is the product of TIC and the probability of filing a claim 
and the two multiplying factors have opposite correlation signs with respect to the 
effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement, we do not know which effect would 
dominate a priori. Therefore, our first model allows for a non-linearity specification of the 
relationship between government effectiveness and the number of patent infringement claims. 
 While it is widely acknowledged that IPR protection is a driving force for attracting 
foreign investors (Section 3.2 will review this line of literature), there has been a shortage of 
research attention paid to the effect of FDI activities on the level of IPR protection. Our first 
model provides a convenient base for quantifying this important effect and thus enriches the 
literature. By introducing FDI and its interactive variables with government effectiveness in 
the first model, we can link FDI inflows to observed infringement claim numbers and 
government effectiveness, and explore whether inward FDI influences IPR infringement 
claim patterns through inducing a higher level of government effectiveness. This is our 
second model. 
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3.2 Influence of IPR protection and government effectiveness on activities of foreign 
funded enterprises in China 
Since the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998), a 
growing body of research in political economy and finance has suggested legal origin, 
whether a country follows common laws or civic laws, has persistent impacts on various 
dimensions of legal institutions, which in turn leads to systematic difference in economic 
performance. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argues that common law countries tend to have 
better investor protection, measured by quality of legal rules and law enforcement than civil 
law countries, and thus are more likely to house broader equity and debt markets. Djankov et 
al. (2007) shows that a country with better creditor protection is more likely to have 
developed private credit market.  Djankov et al. (2008) demonstrate that stronger debt 
enforcement is positively correlated with GDP per capita and debt market development. 
These studies find evidence that effective legal rules and law enforcement are conducive to 
protection of outside investors’ rights, which in turn promotes external financing.  
 In the international business literature, recent empirical evidence has shown that 
effective institutional environment in a host country is an important determinant of foreign 
direct investment inflows (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Seyoum, 2009; Mengistua and 
Adhikary, 2011; Hsu and Tiao, 2015). Using international data on FDI inflows and outflows, 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find that good governance affects the security of property 
rights, transparency of government and legal processes and thus attract more FDI inflows. 
Also, using a probit model with data on outward FDI from the United States, Globerman and 
Shapiro (2003) argue that good institutions in host countries establish a conducive climate to 
the multinational companies from the USA. By examining the effects of the World Bank’s 
notion of good governance on FDI inflows in 15 Asian countries, Mengistua and Adhikary 
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(2011) find that political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, and control of corruption are the key determinants of FDI inflows. These findings 
highlight the importance of improving the domestic governance environment for attracting 
FDI inflows, which is also confirmed by Seyoum (2009), finding that strong formal 
institutions in host countries attract more FDI flows. Hsu and Tiao (2015) investigate the 
relationship between patent rights protection and inward FDI in eleven Asian countries and 
their empirical results indicate that the strengthening of patent rights protection has a positive 
impact on inward FDI in Asian countries.  
 In light of the above discussion, it seems that we can simply hypothesize that the more 
effective IPR protection and government is associated with more active foreign investment. 
However, an in-depth observation of the Chinese context suggests more complex and 
interesting relationships between the level of IPR protection and that of FDI activities. On 
one hand, one may argue that a larger number of claims may signal weak IRP protection, 
which in turn deters foreign firm’s activities. If it is true, there will be a negative relationship 
between the number of patent infringement cases and the level of FDI activities.  On the other 
hand, our discussion in this and previous subsection has implied that the effect of claim 
counts on FFE activities may differ owing to the regional heterogeneity in IPR protection. 
For example, in a more developed region with stronger IPR protection, it is plausible that the 
demand for (or probability of filing) claims is already high. In such a regulatory environment, 
an increase in claim counts can be interpreted as an increase in IPR infringement, thus 
representing a negative signal to potential foreign entrepreneurs. By contrast, in a less 
developed region with a weak IPR protection regime, the total infringement incidents might 
be already very high. An increase in claim counts here can indicate that the existing IPR 
entrepreneurs are keener to raise claims upon infringement. This signals that they believe the 
enforcement of law and regulations in the region is more trustworthy than before, and thus 
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represents good news for potential foreign investors in the region. To test this idea, we 
introduce Coast dummy which takes the value of 1 for the observations from the coastal 
region and zero otherwise.3 In general, the coastal (non-coastal) areas have better (worse) 
enforcement of law and regulations. 4 Thus, we expect a positive association of Claim Count 
and level of FDI activities in the non-coastal region and a negative association of the two 
variables in the coast region.    
 
4. Data, Variables, and Estimation Methods 
4.1 Dependent Variables  
The dependent variable in our first and second models is the relative level of patent 
infringement cases claimed in region i and year t (
itClaim ), which is measured as the ratio of 
patent infringement cases claimed in region i and year t to the national total number of patent 
infringement cases claimed in year t, and is presented in percentage. To measure business 
activity of MNEs in China which is the dependent variable in our third model, we use the 
logarithm of the number of foreign funded enterprises in region i and year t ( itnumberFFE ,ln ). 
Data used in our estimations is a panel of 30 provinces and municipalities over the period 
2002-2012. Among all 31 provinces and municipalities in China, Tibet is excluded mainly 
because of data unavailability. The number of patent infringement cases claimed at the 
provincial level is obtained from Patent Statistical Yearbook published by the State 
Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO, www.gov.cn). The data source for foreign 
                                                          
3 The coastal regions include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, and Hainan. 
4. We use coastal vs. non-coastal classification to sort the regions according to the maturity of law and regulatory 
enforcement. In unreported robustness tests, we have also performed similar regressions using different dummy 
variables such as high vs. low government effectiveness, etc. Our qualitative results are robust to these 
alternative specifications. 
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funded enterprises in China is obtained from China Statistical Yearbook (various years) 
published by the State Bureau of Statistics in China.  
 
4.2 Independent Variables  
The variable representing the effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement is the 
government effectiveness index in the region i and year t ( itEffect ), which is measured as 
the average of city-level government effectiveness index across cities in province i and year t 
(t = 2006). The information on local government effectiveness in China is obtained from 
World Bank (2006). It was based on a large survey of 120 cities and 12,400 firms conducted 
in 2006 and has been the most comprehensive survey on government effectiveness in China 
so far. Since the unit of analysis we adopt in this study is province, we aggregate and 
organize the survey data into 30 provinces (Table 2). Following the discussion of Section 3.1, 
we take both itEffect   and its square to capture the possible non-linear effect of the 
effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement on the relative level of patent infringement 
claims. Please note that itnumberFFE ,ln  will also be an independent variable in our second 
model.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.3 Control Variables  
Although we suggest the importance of the law and regulatory enforcement in determining 
the level of patent infringement and business activities of MNEs, a number of other factors 
have been identified in the literature as important determinants of piracy activity levels and 
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FDI. To take into account the effects of those factors, we incorporate a comprehensive set of 
control variables in our empirical estimations. First, we employ the measures and proxies 
involving regional market size, regional output of knowledge production, and regional 
openness level. In addition, we also include yearly and regional fixed effects to address 
unobserved time and regional specific characteristics.    
Regional market size is measured by the logarithm of gross regional product in the 
region i and year t and denoted as itGRPln . Regional output of knowledge production is 
defined as the relative level of patent applications in the region i and year t (
itPatent ), which 
is measured as the ratio of patent application numbers in the region i and year t to the national 
total number of patent applications in year t, and is presented in percentage. The degree of 
openness (
itOpen  ) is proxied by the ratio of the total amount of trade (the sum of total 
export and import value by place of destination or origin) in region i and year t to the gross 
regional product in region i and year t and is presented in percentage. Data sources for 
constructing all above control variables are China Statistical Year Book (various years).  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables 
employed in our empirical regressions. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.4 Econometric Model and Estimation Methods   
16 
 
To test the existence of the non-linear relationship between the relative level of patent 
infringement claims and government effectiveness with the above-discussed robustness 
control, we formulate our first model as follows: 
   ittiit
ittiiiit
uOpen
PatentGRPEffectEffectClaim




5
43
2
2006,22006,10
            
ln 
        (1)
 
where iu  and t  capture region- and year-specific effects, respectively, and it is an error 
term. Our second model is specified as a natural extension of Eq (1): 
ittiitnumberi
itnumberiitit
tiitnumberiiit
uFFEEffect
FFEEffectOpenPatent
GRPFFEEffectEffectClaim






,
2
2006,8
,2006,765
4,3
2
2006,22006,10
*            
*            
ln 
  (2)
 
 We then formulate our third model as follows to test the relationship between MNEs’ 
business activities, relative level of patent infringement claims and government effectiveness 
with the same set of robustness control as in Eq (1): 
 ittiit
ittiiititnumber
uOpen
PatentGRPEffectClaimFFE




5
432006,210,
            
ln 
            (3) 
           ittiitit
tiiitititnumber
uOpenPatent
GRPEffectCoastClaimClaimFFE




65
42006,3210,
                   
ln* 
  (3’)
 
Panel data method is used to control unobserved individual effects in the data. To 
choose fixed or random effects, the Hausman test is conducted and it reveals that the 
unobserved individual effects are correlated with the regressors. Therefore, the fixed effects 
estimator is the preferred model. However, one of the main disadvantages of the fixed effects 
estimator is that it wipes out the effects of time-invariant regrossors (e.g., 2006,iEffect ). Using 
Monte Carlo experiments, Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte (2003) show that the random effects 
model leads to misleading inference if some regressors are correlated with the individual 
effects. We use the Hausman-Taylor model (1981) to address this issue. By using the 
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individual means of exogenous regressors as instruments for the time invariant regressors, the 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator recaptures the estimates of time-invariant regressors 
under a model where some of the regressors are correlated with the individual effects. In our 
empirical exercises, however, we report both random effect and Hausman-Taylor estimations 
for Eq. (1) and both fixed effect and Hausman-Taylor estimations for Eqs. (2), (3) and (3’) to 
show the advantage of Hausman-Taylor methods and also the robustness of our key results 
with respect to estimator choice. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Impact of government effectiveness on patent infringement claims in China 
Eq. (1) is estimated by the random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators, respectively. The 
estimation results are presented in Models 1-4 of Table 4. Let us first look at the results of 
Models 1 and 3, which focus on the linear effect of 2006,iEffect  only.  The coefficient 
estimations of 2006,iEffect produced by random effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators are 
statistically insignificant and this suggests that the non-linear effects of government 
effectiveness on claim counts may have been cancelled out in the linear setting. Models 2 and 
4 investigate the non-linear effect hypothesis using random-effect and Hausman-Talyor 
methods. The results support an inverted U-shaped relationship between government 
effectiveness and the relative level of infringement claims. For instance, the coefficients of 
2006,iEffect ( 1ˆ  0.387) and 
2
2006,iEffect ( 2ˆ 0.003) support an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between law enforcement effectiveness and the relative level of infringement 
claims. This result suggests that in the early development stage of law and regulatory 
enforcement, the marginal effect of tighter enforcement on the probability of encouraging 
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patent owners to raise cases is greater than that on reducing the violations of patent rights; as 
a result, tighter enforcement is associated with a higher level of infringement claims. It is in 
this sense we say that such bad news as a higher level of infringement claims is good news 
for foreign investors because it signals an improvement in the law and regulatory 
enforcement in the region. By contrast, in the latter development stage when the effectiveness 
of law and regulatory enforcement has reached a high level, the marginal effect of tighter 
enforcement on reducing the violations of patent rights is greater than that on the probability 
of filing a claim and thus tighter enforcement will lead to a reduced number of violation cases.  
 With regard to control variables in Models 1-4, their coefficients all are positive and 
statistically significant. This implies that a region with a larger regional market size 
( itGRPln ), a greater regional output of knowledge production ( itPatent ), and a greater 
degree of openness (
itOpen ) is likely to experience a relatively higher level of infringement 
claim cases.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.2 Moderating effect of FDI activities on the relationship between patent infringement 
claims and government effectiveness in China  
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Model 5 in Table 4 tests if activities of foreign funded enterprises have a direct impact on 
patent infringement.5 The coefficient of  itnumberFFE ,ln  is statistically insignificant and this 
result does not suggest a direct impact of FDI inflows on infringement claim numbers. 
Considering our discussions on the relationship between inward FDI and government 
effectiveness and the non-linear relationship between government effectiveness and 
infringement claim numbers (Section 3), the impact of inward FDI on infringement claim 
numbers might be channelled through the direct relationship between government 
effectiveness and infringement claims. Model 6 addresses this concern with the help of the 
interaction terms itnumberi FFEEffect ,2006, ln*  and itnumberi FFEEffect ,
2
2006, ln* .  In Model 6, 
while the coefficients on itnumberFFE ,ln  and 
2
,ln itnumberFFE  remain statistically 
insignificant, the coefficients of the two interactive terms are significant. More interestingly, 
the moderating effect of FDI activities does not alter the inverted U-shaped pattern of the 
basic relationship between government effectiveness and IPR protection, but pushes the curve 
rightwards, which is equivalent to an improvement in government effectiveness in the basic 
relationship. It is in this way that FDI activities make a contribution to the improvement in 
IPR protection.  To ensure the robustness of this set of empirical findings, we conducted 
robustness tests using alternative measurements for the activities of foreign funded 
enterprises in China.  The alternative measurements include the logarithm of the amount of 
investment of foreign funded enterprises in region i and year t ( itinvestmentFFE ,ln ) and the 
amount of registered capital of foreign funded enterprises ( itCapitalFFE ,ln ) in region i and year 
                                                          
5 Because of high correlation between 
itnumberFFE ,ln  and itGRPln , we do not include the latter in Models 5 
and 6.  
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t. The robustness tests generate statistically equivalent results to our main findings reported in 
Models 5 and 6 in Table 4.6  
 
5.3 Impact of government effectiveness on activities of foreign funded enterprises in 
China 
Eqs. (3) and (3’) are estimated by fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor estimators. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 5. Models 1-3 in Table 5 test the impact of claim 
cases (
itClaim ) and government effectiveness ( 2006,iEffect ) separately. Model 1 examines the 
role of the claim variable without the coastal region dummy and using the fixed effect 
approach. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on claims count is statistically insignificant. As 
hinted in section 3.2, it is possible that the signs of the coefficient on claim cases are different 
across regional zones with different effective levels of law and regulatory enforcement. In the 
presence of such disparity, the average effect could become insignificant. Model 2 addresses 
this concern with the help of the coastal area dummy. In Model 2, the coefficient of 
itClaim variable is significantly positive and the coefficient of CoastClaimit  is negative 
(with a p value = 0.105). Consistent with our expectation in Section 3.2, these results indicate 
that a higher level of claims count number in the coastal provinces is associated with a lower 
level of FDI activities and the opposite relationship holds in the inland regions. This contrast 
suggests that an increase in claim counts in different types of regions sends different signals 
to potential foreign investors. In inland provinces where the base-number of total 
infringement case has already been relatively high, more claim-counts would mean a higher 
probability of filing claims, which reflects the incumbents’ confidence that the law and 
regulatory enforcement in the region is improving. This is good news to foreign investors. On 
                                                          
6 These robustness test results are available upon request. 
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the contrary, the coastal regions have a relatively effective enforcement system, which would 
lead to a higher probability of filing claims. Thus, an increase in claim counts in coastal 
regions can be a result of increasing infringement activities and this comes as bad news. In 
Model 3, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of 2006,iEffect  indicates that the 
number of foreign funded firms is positively related to the level of regional government 
effectiveness, consistent with the literature.  
Models 4 and 5 assess the effect of both 
itClaim and 2006,iEffect   jointly. Consistent 
with the results from Model 1, the coefficient of 
itClaim is insignificant when regional 
disparity (coastal vs inland regions) is not accounted for. The coefficient of 2006,iEffect  in 
Model 4 is significantly positive but the magnitude of the marginal effect is weaker than that 
of Model 3 (0.005 vs. 0.021). Nevertheless, when we take into account regional disparity in 
the effects of 
itClaim by including an interaction term ( CoastClaimit  ), the coefficients of 
both 
itClaim  (  0.020) and CoastClaimit  (  -0.024) become statistically significant 
even if the quality of government effectiveness and other influential factors are controlled for. 
Again, these results support our expectation in Section 3.2. The coefficients of 2006,iEffect  in 
Models 3-5 are consistently positive and statistically significant as conventionally expected.  
 Turning to control variables, their coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
across all models in Table 5, except the coefficient of 
itPatent  which is statistically 
insignificant in all 5 models.   
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
22 
 
6. Discussions and Conclusions 
Despite an emerging body of literature on the issue of weak and uneven IPR protection in 
China, there has been a lack of econometric research to quantitatively assess the relationship 
between IPR violations and government effectiveness and further the role of FDI inflows in 
their relationship and their impact on FDI inflows in the context of China. This study has 
addressed this challenge and thus filled an important niche in the literature. 
 This study takes into consideration infringement disputes, government effectiveness 
and inward FDI in the context of China’s institutional environment and develops three 
models. The first model addresses the non-linear relationship between the relative level of 
infringement claim cases and the effectiveness level of law and regulatory enforcement 
across provinces in China. The second model features the moderating role played by FDI 
activities in improving government effectiveness and law enforcement. The third model 
characterises the important role played by government effectiveness and law enforcement in 
attracting foreign investors. The empirical estimation of the third model also reveals that 
regional disparity in the effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement leads to different 
signalling effects of IPR infringement claim cases to foreign investors.  
  Because one of the key independent variables, government effectiveness 
( 2006,iEffect ) is time-invariant and some of the independent variables are correlated with the 
individual effects, we employ the Hausman-Taylor method to estimate our panel-data models 
and to detect the non-linear relationship between the relative level of infringement claim 
cases and the effectiveness level of law and regulatory  enforcement across provinces in 
China. Using the number of patent infringement claim cases under administrative 
investigation and the number of foreign funded enterprises in 30 provinces of China during 
2002-2012 and the government effectiveness index in 30 Chinese provinces constructed by 
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the World Bank in 2006, the estimation results support the specifications of our three models 
and are consistent with our analytical expectation. The results show that the relationship 
between government effectiveness and the relative level of infringement claim cases is non-
linear and exhibits an inverted-U shaped effect. This result suggests that in an early 
development stage of law and regulatory enforcement, the bad news of a rising number of 
IPR dispute cases signals the good news of an obvious improvement in the effectiveness of 
law and regulatory enforcement which encourages patent owners to raise legal cases. By 
contrast, in the later development stage  when the law and regulatory enforcement has 
become relatively much more effective, the bad news of a rising number of IPR dispute cases 
does manifest itself as real bad news. In addition, this study confirms that the FDI activities 
contribute to better IPR protection through improving government effectiveness and the 
government effectiveness is one of the key factors promoting FDI activities. 
 Our finding offers an interesting policy implication. Suppose that policy makers in 
developing countries/regions consider implementing more stringent IPR enforcement to 
attract more foreign investment with advanced technology. It is highly likely that such an 
implementation will lead to an initial increase in IPR claims counts, which may become news 
headlines. Our findings suggest that the policy makers should focus on improving the 
effectiveness of law and regulatory enforcement, rather than worrying about an initial 
increase in IPR claim counts or even deliberately covering-up IPR infringement cases, 
because intelligent investors will read such headlines as good news and become more willing 
to invest in the country/region. 
 In addition to revealing the above insight, this study also contributes to the 
international business literature by quantitatively modelling the moderating effect of FDI 
activities on the relationship between government effectiveness and the IPR infringement 
claim cases, and the effects of government effectiveness on the IPR infringement claim 
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numbers and FDI inflows. Our finding suggests that FDI inflows actually enhance IPR 
protection by improving government effectiveness. This finding encourages foreign investors 
to pay more attention to the agglomeration effect of FDI in promoting government 
effectiveness and furthermore in IPR protection. Our modelling framework and the associated 
empirical testing methods are clearly applicable to similar data from other countries. Future 
research in this direction would be able to check the extent to which the findings of this 
research can be generalized. 
 Two limitations of this study are worth mentioning. First, the government 
effectiveness index (World Bank, 2006) this study has adopted is only available for one year. 
Although this index is the most comprehensive and reliable so far7 and the issue of time-
invariance variable in regression model can be addressed by Hausman-Taylor estimator, it 
might not be able to capture the effect of government effectiveness over time. Future research 
could examine this issue when updated government effectiveness index becomes available 
across provinces and also over time. Second, the number of infringement claim cases this 
study has used is based on patent infringement only and do not cover other sources of 
infringement such as counterfeiting goods, trademark, copyrights etc. Future research should 
work with various sources of infringement.  
                                                          
7 Please note two potential problems of employing firm-level survey data: nonresponse and false response to 
politically sensitive issues (Jensen, Li and Rahman, 2010). 
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Table 1.  Patent infringement cases claimed in China 
Year 
Coast Central West China Coefficient of 
variation among 
coast, central and 
west regions 
Cases (%) Cases (%) Cases (%) Cases (%) 
2002 1,012 (72.34) 231 (16.51) 156 (11.15) 1,399 (100) 1.02 
2003 926 (63.95) 303 (20.93) 219 (15.12) 1,448 (100) 0.80 
2004 919 (64.99) 315 (22.28) 180 (12.73) 1,414 (100) 0.83 
2005 870 (63.97) 313 (23.01) 177 (13.01) 1,360 (100) 0.81 
2006 780 (63.57) 265 (21.60) 182 (14.83) 1,227 (100) 0.79 
2007 635 (64.40) 199 (20.18) 152 (15.42) 986 (100) 0.81 
2008 686 (62.82) 279 (25.55) 127 (11.63) 1,092 (100) 0.79 
2009 573 (61.15) 211 (22.52) 153 (16.33) 937 (100) 0.73 
2010 547 (50.79) 359 (33.33) 171 (15.88) 1,077 (100) 0.52 
2011 652 (50.70) 453 (35.23) 181 (14.07) 1,286 (100) 0.55 
2012 1,313 (59.01) 514 (23.10) 398 (17.89) 2,225 (100) 0.67 
Note: Coast Region includes Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Fujian, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Hainan; Central Region includes Guangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Henan, Anhui, Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia; West Region includes Chongqing, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Gansu, Guizhou, 
Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Tibet. 
Source: Calculated by authors based on Patent Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2013. 
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Table 2. Cities surveyed and average of government effectiveness index at provincial level 
   
Province/ 
municipality 
City Average of government 
effectiveness index at 
provincial level 
Beijing (1) Beijing 52.00 
Tianjin (2) Tianjin 60.50 
Hebei (8) 
Baoding, Cangzhou, Handan, Langfang, Qinhuangdao, 
Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Zhangjikou 59.25 
Shanxi (3) Datong, Taiyuan, Yunchang 98.50 
Inner Mongolia (2) Baotou, Huhehaote 87.50 
Liaoning (6) Anshan, Benxi, Dalian, Fushun, Jinzhou, Shenyang 75.58 
Jilin (2) Changchun, Jilin 94.00 
Heilongjiang (3) Daqing, Haerbing, Qiqihaer 100.67 
Shanghai (1) Shanghai 51.50 
Jiangsu (9) 
Changzhou, Lianyungang, Nanjing, Nantong, Suzhou, 
Wuxi, Xuzhou, Yancheng, Yangzhou 47.50 
Zhejiang (8) 
Hangzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Ningbo, Shaoxing, 
Taizhou, Wenzhou 31.19 
Anhui (4) Anqing, Chuzhou, Hefei, Wuhu 63.00 
Fujian (5) Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Sanming, Xiamen, Zhangzhou 39.10 
Jiangxi (5) Ganzhou, Jiujiang, Nanchang, Shangrao, Yichun 56.40 
Shandong (9) 
Jinan, Jining, Linyi, Qingdao, Taian, Weifang, Weihai, 
Yantai, Zibo 20.94 
Henan (7) 
Luoyang, Nanyang, Shangqiu, Xinxiang, Xuchang, 
Zhengzhou, Zhoukou 62.36 
Hubei (7) 
Huanggang, Jingmen, Jingzhou, Wuhan, Xiangfan, 
Xiaogan, Yichang 77.36 
Hunan (6) 
Changde, Changsha, Chenzhou, Hengyang, Yueyang, 
Zhuzhou 100.00 
Guangdong (9) 
Dongguan, Foshan, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiangmen, 
Maoming, Shantou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai 21.17 
Guangxi (3) Guilin, Liuzhou, Nanning 85.83 
Hainan (1) Haikou 86.50 
Chongqing (1) Chongqing 57.00 
Sichuan (5) Chengdu, Deyang, Leshan, Mianyang, Yibin 65.00 
Guizhou (2) Guiyang, Zunyi 97.50 
Yunnan (3) Kunming, Qujing, Yuxi 76.17 
Shaanxi (3) Baoji, Xian, Xianyang 61.67 
Gansu (2) Lanzhou, Tianshui 101.00 
Qinghai (1) Xining 102.00 
Ningxia (2) Wuzhong, Yinchuan 64.75 
Xinjiang (1) Wulumuqi 77.00 
Source. Calculated by authors based on World Bank (2006); A smaller index value indicates higher level of 
government effectiveness.  
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics and correlation matrixa,b  
 
           
 
           
  Mean S.D. Min. Max. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(5 
           
 
           
(1)
itClaim  3.331 4.763 0 29.664 1.000     
 
  
          
(2)
itEffect  
69.098 23.245 20.944 102 -0.610 1.000     
  
          
(3) 
itnumberFFE ,ln
 8.436 1.409 4.812 11.498 0.527 -0.709 1.000    
           
(4)
itGRPln  
8.785 1.016 5.797 10.952 0.508 -0.533 0.849 1.000   
  
          
(5)
itPatentln  
3.333 4.541 0.045 25.067 0.722 -0.669 0.706 0.570 1.000  
  
          
(6)
itOpen  
34.312 42.913 3.572 174.968 0.419 -0.569 0.652 0.356 0.680 1.000 
 
           
 
            
a N = 330.  
b All correlation coefficients are significant at p  0.001. 
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Table 4. Estimation results: Effects of governance effectiveness and FDI on infringement claims  
       
Dependent variable:  
itClaim  
Model 1 
(Random effects) 
Model 2 
(Random effects) 
Model 3 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
Model 4 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
Model 5 
(Fixed effects) 
Model 6 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
              
Independent Variables       
 
      
2006,iEffect
         0.037 [0.028]  0.448*** [0.103]      -0.004 [0.039]  0.387*** [0.163]    1.948*** [0.727] 
 
      
2
2006,iEffect
  -0.003*** [0.001]  -0.003*** [0.001]  -0.013*** [0.005] 
 
      
itnumberFFE ,ln          0.452 [0.503]       -1.387 [4.288] 
 
      
2
,ln itnumberFFE             -0.220 [0.146]        
itnumberFFEEffect ,ln*
          0.142** [0.070] 
       
itnumberFFEEffect ,
2 ln*       -0.001** [0.0004] 
 
      
Control Variables       
 
      
itGRPln    1.580** [0.680]    1.244** [0.602] 3.284*** [1.170]   2.265** [1.126]   
       
itPatent  0.204*** [0.069] 0.177*** [0.068]   0.155** [0.070]   0.146** [0.070]    0.175** [0.069]   0.196*** [0.067] 
       
itOpen    0.024** [0.010]   0.018** [0.009] 0.030*** [0.011] 0.026*** [0.010] 0.039*** [0.013]      0.026** [0.012] 
       
Constant      -8.053 [6.605]       7.264 [6.770] -24.41** [11.19]     -5.647 [11.950]      -2.039 [3.868]      56.60* [33.132] 
       
Wald Chi2 62.38*** 95.48*** 50.49*** 65.06***  66.60*** 
       
F-Statistics     1.67*  
       
R2 0.485 0.635   0.337  
       
       
† N = 330.  
†† Significance levels: * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. 
††† Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors. 
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Table 5. Estimation results: Effects of government effectiveness on FDI 
      
 
Model 1 
(Fixed effects) 
Model 2 
(Fixed effects) 
Model 3 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
Model 4 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
Model 5 
(Hausman-Taylor) 
            
Independent Variables      
 
     
itClaim      0.004 [0.007]     0.020* [0.012]             0.004 [0.007]    0.020* [0.012] 
 
     
CoastClaimit        -0.024
# [0.015]     -0.024* [0.014] 
      
2006,iEffect     0.021*** [0.005] 0.005*** [0.007] 0.023*** [0.005] 
 
     
Control Variables      
 
     
       itGRPln  0.477*** [0.031]  0.470*** [0.032]  0.485*** [0.032] 0.484*** [0.032] 0.478*** [0.032] 
      
       
itPatent      -0.008 [0.008]      -0.007 [0.008]      -0.005 [0.008]     -0.006 [0.008]      -0.004 [0.008] 
      
       
itOpen  0.009*** [0.001]  0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 0.010*** [0.001] 
      
Constant 3.886*** [0.275]     3.933* [0.276] 5.333*** [0.477] 5.315*** [0.479] 5.429*** [0.487] 
      
F-statistics/Wald Chi2 97.93*** 91.62*** 1365.85*** 1362.39*** 1317.371*** 
      
R2 0.836 0.823    
      
† N = 330.  
†† Significance levels: # = 0.105, * p  0.10, ** p  0.05, *** p  0.01. 
††† Numbers in [ ] are standardized errors. 
 
